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Objectives: Evidence based patient choice seems based on a strong liberal individualist interpretation of
patient autonomy; however, not all patients are in favour of such an interpretation. The authors wished to
assess whether ideals of autonomy in clinical practice are more in accordance with alternative concepts of
autonomy from the ethics literature. This paper describes the development of a questionnaire to assess such
concepts of autonomy.
Methods: A questionnaire, based on six moral concepts from the ethics literature, was sent to aneurysm
patients and their surgeons. The structure of the questionnaire was assessed by factor analysis, and item
reduction was based on reliability.
Results: Ninety six patients and 58 surgeons participated. The questionnaire consisted of four scales. Two
of the scales reflected the paternalistic and consumerist poles of the liberal individualist model, one scale
reflected concepts of Socratic autonomy and of procedural independence, and the fourth scale reflected
ideals of risk disclosure.
Discussion: The Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale is a 14 item normative instrument. It is clearly distinct from
the generally used psychological preference questionnaires that assess preferences for physician-patient
roles.
I
n the last two decades, the term ‘‘patient autonomy’’ has
appeared more and more frequently in the medical
literature. A textword search in PubMed provided 41
citations for 1980 and 324 for 2000. In the medical literature
authors generally seem to imply the liberal individualist
concept of autonomy as defined by Beauchamp and
Childress,1 in which autonomous patients are choosers who
act intentionally, with understanding, and without control-
ling influences that determine their actions. According to this
interpretation of autonomy, the goal for an autonomous
person is to decide on his or her own, without undue
manipulation by others. In the medical subject headings
(MeSH) the term ‘‘autonomy’’, which is not a MeSH term, is
however associated with the MeSH term ‘‘freedom’’—that is,
‘‘the rights of individuals to act and make decisions without
external constraints’’. One of the first empirical papers in
medical decision making on patient autonomy2 thus linked
autonomy to the question of whether patients wanted to
make decisions themselves. In the descriptive medical
decision making literature, this meaning has become the
default.3 4 Autonomy refers to the decision making dimension
of the patient role, and enhancing patient autonomy means
helping patients make their own decisions. The patient
described in the informative model from the well known
paper of Emanuel and Emanuel5 corresponds with an
autonomous patient in this sense. In this connotation, a
concomitant dimension that is often evaluated simulta-
neously in research on patient autonomy, is that of desire
for information.2 4 Patients who actively seek information are
generally seen as more autonomous because, in the liberal
individualist interpretation, information is seen as a neces-
sary condition for autonomous choice.
In the ethics literature other connotations of the term auto-
nomy have appeared, which are increasingly used to describe
(and prescribe) medical practices. These alternative concepts of
autonomy will be described in the next section. Examples are
autonomy as critical reflection, as proposed by Dworkin,6 and
autonomy as identification, as advocated by Agich.7 Unfor-
tunately, the medical literature seldom refers to these concepts
of autonomy, although they are potentially of great use.
Many descriptive studies in health care have assessed the
prevalence of patient preferences for the liberal individualist
interpretation. These studies have generally not assessed
patient ideals, but have described autonomy as a psychological
attribute, and have tried to scale patients on a preference
questionnaire (Molewijk AC, unpublished data)—well
known, for example, is the Degner Control Preferences
Scale,8 assessing patients’ preferences for independent
decision making. From this descriptive literature it emerged
that many patients do not have a strong preference for
autonomy in the liberal individualist sense, and many even
prefer a paternalistic model (see Benbassat3 for an overview).
Such preferences seem at odds with the ideal of evidence-
informed patient choice,9 in which an autonomous patient in
the liberal individualist sense decides for himself. It fits more
closely with an alternative concept of autonomy, like
Dworkin’s above mentioned concept of critical reflection
(also named procedural independence).6 According to this
concept a patient may decide to leave all the decisions to the
physician, in a way similar to that of religious subjects who
deliver themselves to their elder.
In our research we wished to explore patients’ and
physicians’ perceptions of autonomy while extending the
concept beyond the liberal individualist ideal of independent
decision making. We wished to explore these perceptions
from an explicitly normative point of view—that is, to explore
ideals not preferences. An ideal is based upon critical reflection
on what one wants to be or how one wants to act, referring to
the ‘‘good life’’, in line with one’s norms and values.
Preferences are more affective, and refer to what is most
satisfactory. A patient’s ideal might be to act with respon-
sibility and make the decision him or herself. In practice this
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same patient may prefer to leave the decision to the
physician, because ultimately she or he does not have the
courage to decide (Molewijk, unpublished observations). As
the prevailing interpretation of autonomy in the medical
literature appears to be the liberal individualist one and, as in
practice, patient preferences are at odds with this interpreta-
tion, we wished to assess whether patient ideals are different
from their preferences or whether other views than the liberal
individualist prevail in practice. Studying patient ideals, and
social practices in general, is important from the perspective
of integrated empirical ethics.10 11 Integrated empirical ethics
research refers to studies in which ethicists and social
scientists cooperate in combining moral theory and social
scientific research methods. Such studies result from the
view that, in the end, there is no fundamental distinction
between fact and value, and that the empirical and the
normative are interconnected. On the one hand, facts
produced by ‘‘descriptive’’ sciences are interwoven with
discipline specific epistemic values—for example, the infor-
mation presented to patients may partly shape a certain kind
of patient autonomy. On the other hand, every moral theory
is based on empirical premises. In the context of our research,
different moral theories on patient autonomy assume
different ideas with respect to the identity and rationality
of humans. One cannot construct a normative theory on
patient autonomy without referring to an interpretation of
what human beings actually ‘‘are’’. If empirical research
shows that a certain empirical premise is not feasible, then it
might challenge the validity of the associated moral theory.
People should not be held to a standard that they are unlikely
to satisfy.12 For example, if social scientific research shows
that many patients do not have the cognitive capacity to
understand medical information, one may question the
liberal individualist notion of patient autonomy.
Integrated empirical ethics thus does not believe in the
prima facie moral authority of a social practice nor in that of
a moral theory. It is concerned with the contextual relevance
of moral theory for the morality of specific social practices
and vice versa (that is, morality derives its meaning from the
context). A goal of using empirical data may be the
improvement of existing moral theories. For example, one
might wish to modify the theory of patient autonomy
towards the social practice of surgical decision making in
elderly men on the basis of empirical data.
To assess the moral beliefs within the practice of surgical
decision making, we wished to develop a scale that assesses
patients’ and clinicians’ ideals of autonomy, not their pre-
ferences, and that links these ideals to elements from the most
important prevailing ethical theories (to be described in the
next section). A somewhat similar attempt at eliciting ideals—
limited to surgeons, not patients—has been described by
Falkum and Førde,13 who restricted their assessment to the
central dimensions of three of the four well known models of
the physician-patient relationship of Emanuel and Emanuel5
(the paternalistic, the informative, and the deliberative*). A
scale that on first examination seems to have a somewhat
similar normative objective is the Patient-Practitioner
Orientation Scale developed by Krupat et al.14 In this scale,
the items are framed in a normative sense (‘‘the doctor
should…’’), but nevertheless it is aimed at assessing patient
centred versus disease centred preferences, and solely from a
patient perspective. We explicitly wished to assess these views
both in clinicians and in their patients, because it is in their
interaction that decisions are made. In any physician-patient
relation, whether paternalistic or other, both parties play a role
and the views of both are therefore relevant.
The study presented here was performed in the context of a
large research project on decision support and patient
autonomy in surgical decision making. Our study has an
explorative character. We did not start from one normative
point of view, nor was our ultimate goal to quantify the
prevalence of the support for the various theories. We wished
to assess whether aspects of ethical theories other than liberal
individualism can be distinguished in medical practice. As
preferences for information have been found to be the second
major dimension of patient autonomy in the descriptive
literature, we were interested in the role of risk information
in different concepts of patient autonomy. Information may
be perceived as necessary for autonomous decision making,
but at the same time its sometimes complex and threatening
nature may obstruct autonomous decision making if patients
feel overwhelmed by the information.
This paper describes our attempt at developing and testing
a questionnaire to assess patients’ and surgeons’ ideals of
autonomy. It describes the item selection, the factor
structure, and internal consistency of the scale. It presents
the validity checks we performed: assessing correlations
among the subscales of the instrument, and comparing scores
on the instrument with a question on patients preferences for
participation in treatment decisions that is often used in
decision making research.15 As some of the items covered in
our questionnaire pertain to the decision making role, we
expected our questionnaire to correlate with this question,
but the correlation was not expected to be very high, given
the more normative perspective that we held.
METHODS
The construction of the Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale
The starting point for the construction of the questionnaire
was the following six moral concepts of patient autonomy
from the ethics literature (Molewijk AC, unpublished data).
N The liberal legal concept of respect for autonomy, based on
Berlin’s negative concept of freedom,16 which stresses
‘‘freedom from’’ interference by others. It protects vulner-
able patients from unwanted interference by physicians by
demanding respect for a patient’s integrity. It is thus
directed towards those who treat or care for the patient,
not to the patient himself.
N The liberal individualist concept of autonomy as defined
by Beauchamp and Childress,1 who define autonomous
patients as choosers who act intentionally, with under-
standing, and without controlling influences that deter-
mine their actions. It thus assumes that patients are
rational and reasonable agents. Proponents of this concept
of autonomy believe that a physician’s obligation to
respect autonomy outweighs, to a certain degree, profes-
sional obligations of beneficence.
N Autonomy as critical reflection, within the theory of
procedural independence,6 is normative in its criteria for
the process of autonomous decision making. If the criteria
of procedural independence are satisfied, this approach
offers room for conscious submission to some form of
external authority (for example, a physician, a religion, a
leader, etc). In this concept, the paternalistic physician can
play a role. Central to this concept is the critical reflection
on decisions. After critical reflection on their preferences,
patients may choose to let the physician decide which
treatment is best.
N Actual autonomy as identification,7 which refers to the
process of identification with one’s actions. It originated in
phenomenological approaches to health care, in which
identification refers to judging experiences in the light of
one’s value orientation towards actions. It is important in
this interpretation for a patient to identify him or herself
* The authors viewed the fourth model—the interpretive model—to have
limited relevance for medical consultations as compared (for example)
with psychotherapy.
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with the decision made, not so much to make the decision
him or herself. Identity refers not so much to identity as an
independent being, but to identity as a social being
influenced by emotions and by ties with others.
Dependence is not problematic if one can identify with
the source upon which or whom one is dependent.
N Socratic autonomy, which stresses the importance of
caring, and thus links the concept of autonomy with
existential fragility and patients’ vulnerability. The core is
not an ethics of personal responsibility and self determi-
nation, but an ethics of care and of interdependence.17 18
N Autonomy as negotiated consent19 refers to interpersonal
and social communication, instead of individual and
rational considerations. Communication should be under-
stood as a process of negotiation in which people try to
define the meaning of the situation in which they are
involved. Patients and physicians should have an intention
to mutual understanding and to explicit and just commu-
nication. Perhaps this theory best fits many of the ideas on
shared decision making that have evolved in recent years.20
Using the theories, we developed 55 initial statements to be
answered on a 5 point scale (ranging from ‘‘fully disagree’’ to
‘‘fully agree’’). As stated in the introduction, we were also
interested in the specific role of risk information, because
information is consistently associated with autonomy in the
literature. Further, risk information forms an important
component of our decision support. In some of the moral
concepts it is not evident what the role of information would
be in the ideal of autonomy. Therefore the items that pertain
to risk information are not clearly linked to the autonomy
concepts. The statements were piloted in three samples: in
students of high level vocational training in medicine; in
general practitioners during a course in continuing medical
education; and in aneurysm patients. In this pilot, we had
tried to represent each theory with a similar number of items.
Because of lack in variance of some of these items, we
decided to limit the questionnaire to items showing sufficient
variance. Further, the original set of statements included
items that did not discriminate well between the theories, as
the theories in some respects show overlap. Following the
pilot we therefore decided to use the different elements from
the theories merely to obtain a wide range of possible views
of the ideal of autonomy that patients and doctors may hold.
Thus, our aim was not to develop subscales that exactly
represent moral theories, but subscales that may result in a
‘‘normative map’’ of possible patient-physician relationships,
based on these theories. The proposed future use for the
questionnaire is to compare patients’ and surgeons’ positions
on such a normative map (Molewijk, unpublished observa-
tions), and therefore the questionnaire was developed for
and evaluated in both groups. On the basis of the responses
to this questionnaire and psychometric analyses thereof, a
final list of 22 statements was created (see Appendix 1).
Two versions of the instructions were created: a patient
version and a physician version. In both versions, the
respondents were asked what they thought constituted a
good patient-physician relationship, based on their norms
and values. It was explicitly stated that they should not
indicate what had been their experience so far, or what they
thought would be feasible or most commonly encountered.
The surgeons were addressed as physicians—they were not
asked to imagine being patients.
Included as a validity check (as the final item of the
questionnaire) was a question on the patient’s preference for
participation in treatment decision making, which was
developed by Sutherland.15 This item asks for the patient’s
preferred decision making role on a 5 point scale.
Participants
The questionnaire was tested in two samples: a sample of
aneurysm patients and a sample of surgeons and surgical
residents. The patients were participants in a randomised
trial on the effect of individualised evidence based decision
support on the decision making about elective aneurysm
surgery. Patients were recruited from the Leiden University
Medical Center, and from the Westeinde and the Leyenburg
Hospitals in The Hague, all in the West of the Netherlands.
Patients received the questionnaire by mail around the time
of their first appointment with the vascular surgeon. A
prepaid envelope was sent for returning the filled out
questionnaire. The study was approved by the research ethics
committees of all three hospitals.
The surgeons were those participating in the larger
research project, as well as surgical residents from the same
region (between years 1 and 6 of their training). The
surgeons and residents were also sent the questionnaire with
a prepaid return envelope.
Data analysis
A global overview of the data analysis is presented here. For
technical details, the reader is referred to Appendix 2. The
first step in item reduction was based on extremeness of
scores. Items that most respondents agree with are not very
informative and were therefore omitted. Next, a factor
analysis was carried out on the reduced questionnaire to
see whether subscales (factors) could be formed that were
related in some way to the autonomy concepts. The factors
thus found were submitted to a second round of item
reduction. We eliminated items within each factor (subscale)
separately, in a stepwise fashion, based on Cronbach’s a, a
measure of internal consistency.21 In this process of deleting
redundant items the item reduction was not based purely on
statistical grounds—the content of the items was also taken
into account. In this way we tried to create a short question-
naire that covered the relevant domains. We analysed data
for patients and clinicians together, but we also assessed
factor structure and reliability for the two groups separately
to see whether differences were observed. In deciding to
delete an item or not we also took the internal consistency in
the two subgroups into account. Summary scale scores were
calculated by summing the item scores (without weighting)
and transforming these to a 0–100 scale. Association with the
Sutherland question was assessed by correlations and one-
way analysis of variance.
RESULTS
Participants
A total of 160 patients were eligible for the randomised trial:
17 (11%) of whom refused to participate (in the trial). Of the
143 patients thus available for this substudy, 23 (16%) did
not return their questionnaire whereas 18 (15%) of the
returned questionnaires were unusable because the auton-
omy questionnaire had not been filled in. Of the remaining
102 patients (71%), one patient who had missing values for
more than 25% of the 22 items was omitted from the
analysis. Five patients who agreed fully (score=5) to 20
(90%) or more of the items were omitted from the analyses.
This left us with 96 patients available for analysis. Mean age
was 72 (SD 8) years, 90% were male, and 44% had lower, 40%
intermediate, and 16% higher education. Fifty eight of the 71
surgeons and residents approached replied (82%).
 In our pilot study, we had used the term ‘‘your ideal of the patient-
physician relation’’, but this turned out to be too abstract for the patients.
After thorough discussion we decided to use the term ‘‘good relation’’
instead, with the qualifications as given above (Molewijk AC,
unpublished data).
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I tem reduction
The first criterion for item reduction applied was extremity of
mean score. We deleted four items (2, 6, 9, 17) because they
had a mean of greater than 4.5 and standard deviation of less
than 1.0. In the subsequent factor analysis, four factors were
found (see table 1; see Appendix 2 for details of the statistical
analysis). Item reduction based on internal consistency
produced 4 scales (see table 2). The first, and most reliable
factor (a=0.83), was found to be a factor describing the
opinion that the physician should decide and reflected a
relationship based on trust. We will refer to this factor as the
‘‘doctor knows best’’ factor. Item 1 (‘‘The doctor must choose
the treatment with the least health risk, even when the patient
wants a treatment with more health risks’’) also loaded on this
factor, but eliminating this item did not reduce reliability
overall, and improved the reliability for surgeons. Item 8
(‘‘Every patient is obliged to actively think about the
appropriate treatment’’) loaded most strongly on this factor,
but the factor loading was only moderate (0.41) and not much
higher than the item’s loading on the other three factors.
Further, inclusion of this item reduced internal consistency
and was therefore decided against. The second factor
(a=0.62) reflected the view that the patient should decide. The
third factor (a=0.66) described the view that a patient is
entitled to the wish not to participate, and to the wish not to receive
threatening information. The fourth factor consisted of two
items (items 5 and 14) that reflect requirements for risk
information (a=0.63). The four factors explained 19%, 13%,
11%, and 11%, respectively, of the variance after rotation.
An item that we would have preferred to retain is item 7: ‘‘If
doctor and patient properly consult with each other, it does not
matter who makes the final decision’’. It did not clearly fit with
any of the scales, but concerned an important concept from the
ethics literature. We had felt it to reflect both the theory of
negotiated consent and that of actual identification. In the factor
analysis it was originally grouped with item 10 (which we
hoped would reflect procedural independence/critical reflection and
Socratic autonomy), and when forcing four factors it was grouped
with items 5 and 14 (the more legal aspects of information
provision). For both of these combinations, reliability was
inadequate when the item was included. Other items that were
expected to correlate with this item (that were meant to reflect
negotiated consent or identification—see Appendix 1) were
items that had been endorsed by almost everyone, and had
been deleted in the first round of item reduction—for example,
items 2 and 17). In questionnaire development it is not
recommended to keep a single item (for reasons of reliability)
and therefore it was deleted.
As we were concerned about the positive answering
tendency among patients, we tested the impact of agreement.
We assessed how many participants fully agreed with four
pairs of items that we felt were unlikely to elicit full agreement
in both instances in a pair (items 1 and 21, items 8 and 11,
items 8 and 15, and items 10 and 13). Though strictly speaking
these items are not opposites of a scale, we felt that agreeing to
both items in a pair indicated acquiescence bias.22 Five
surgeons had fully agreed with both items in one pair only,
and 20, 17, and nine patients had fully agreed with both items
in one, two, and three pairs, respectively. A factor analysis
without the 26 patients who had agreed to two or more of the
above pairs resulted in a similar structure and similar
reliabilities, except for a reduced reliability in patients for the
non-participation factor, from 0.59 to 0.52.
Correlation among scales
A positive correlation was seen between the ‘‘doctor knows
best’’ scale on the one hand, and both the ‘‘right to non-
participation’’ scale and the ‘‘obligatory risk information’’
Table 1 Factor structure after exploratory factor analysis (n = 144)*
Factor
I II III IV
20. The doctor can presume that the patient knows that people
can die during serious operations.
0.78
16. If doctor and patient cannot agree on which treatment is
best, the doctor should make the final decision.
0.76 20.32
18. The patient should, without much information on the risk
involved, confidently undergo an operation.
0.75
12. During the conversation, the patient must submit himself with
confidence to the expertise of the doctor.
0.65 0.43
4. It is better that the doctor rather than the patient decides which
the best treatment is.
0.64 20.47
1. The doctor must choose the treatment with the least health risk,
even when the patient wants a treatment with more health risks.
0.57
8. Every patient is obliged to actively think about the appropriate
treatment.
0.41 0.35 20.35 20.39
22. As it concerns the body and life of the patient, the patient
should decide.
0.74
13. The patient himself must choose between the various treatments. 0.67
19. It goes too far when the doctor decides which treatment is best
for the patient.
0.58
21. If a patient chooses a treatment with more health risks, the
doctor should respect this treatment decision.
0.57
10. It goes too far when patients themselves have to decide which
treatment is best for them.
20.35
11. Patients should have the right not to be involved in the decision
on the treatment.
0.74
15. Patients who become afraid when thinking about the treatment
decision should be left in peace by the doctor.
0.72
3. If the patient does not want to receive information about risks
the doctor should respect this.
0.65
14. Before a patient consents to a treatment he should receive all
information on the risks involved.
0.84
5. The patient has to be informed on all the risks involved in an
operation.
0.75
*Only factor loadings greater than 0.3 are displayed.
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scale on the other (see table 3). A positive correlation was
also seen between the ‘‘patient should decide’’ scale and the
‘‘right to non-participation’’ scale. The correlation between
the ‘‘obligatory risk information’’ scale and the ‘‘right to non-
participation’’ scale was only moderate.
Association with the Sutherland question
As the distribution of the Sutherland question was skewed
(see table 4), we assessed the association with the scales not
only by correlations but also by means of one way analysis of
variance using the test for linear trend. The associations with
the four scales were as expected (see tables 3 and 4). The
‘‘right to non-participation’’ scale and the ‘‘obligatory risk
information’’ scale were not linearly associated with the item.
The ‘‘patient should decide’’ scale most clearly showed the
expected association (r=0.45, p,0.01), but the ‘‘doctor
knows best’’ scale also showed a (negative) association
(r=20.22, p,0.05). Indeed, in the Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) a linear trend was seen for these two scales.
DISCUSSION
We developed the Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale to assess
ideals of patient autonomy from a broader perspective than
that of liberal individualism alone. Based on factor analysis
and reliability analyses, the original questionnaire of 22 items
was reduced to 14 items that formed four scales with
moderate to good reliability. By incorporating aspects from
various ethical theories a subtler picture of the physician-
patient role emerges than is generally suggested by the
medical literature. Two of the four factors reflect the well
known distinction between physician-centred and patient-
centred decision making. The third is a subtle, but important
aspect of the patient-physician relationship, namely the right
of the patient to decide whether to delegate the decision back
to the physician. The fourth reflects the right and the duty of
patients to be made aware of relevant risks.
When we compare the factor structure with our original
classification of the items according to ethical theories, a
remark should be made. In the pilot study we had abandoned
the idea that we could cover all theories with equal numbers
of statements. The original set of statements included many
items that did not discriminate between theories, and several
items showed no variation between respondents. Thus, we do
not pretend that our original set of items reflected the
theories in a balanced way.
A limitation of our study is the selective sample of patients.
The mean age of our population was high and the level of
education was low. Patients were self selected in that they
were willing to participate in our trial, but as only 11%
refused participation this will not have introduced a large
bias. Just over 30%, however, did not return the question-
naire or did not fill out the Ideal Patient Autonomy Scale.
Further testing in other patient populations is thus needed.
A factor that corresponded closely to our preconceived
ideas about alternative autonomy concepts was the ‘‘right to
non-participation’’ factor. All three items reflected to some
extent the concept of procedural independence, and two
could also be referred to as to Socratic autonomy (see
Appendix 1). This factor may be seen as the counterpart of
the ideal patient in the liberal individualist sense: the view
that a patient is entitled to not participate and to not receive
information that causes fear. The ‘‘doctor knows best’’ factor
encompasses some of the items that we had classified
beforehand as Socratic autonomy or as procedural indepen-
dence. They thereby strongly incorporate the concept of
trust—an important value in medicine.23 The ‘‘patient should
decide’’ factor corresponded quite well with our concepts: all
four items had been classified beforehand as (to some extent)
liberal individualist, even though one item (number 22)
could also be seen as ‘‘identification’’. The ‘‘doctor knows
best’’ scale and the ‘‘patient should decide’’ scale emerged as
two distinct factors that seem to represent the opposites of a
continuum. Forcing the two factors into one did reduce the
reliability to 0.71, and subsequent stepwise elimination of
items led to the original doctor knows best scale (with a of
0.83). Thus, the ‘‘patient should decide’’ scale reflects a
distinct concept, which is in accordance with our expecta-
tions as discussed above. The ‘‘obligatory risk information
factor’’, finally, consisted of two items that we had both
classified a priori as ‘‘liberal juridical’’.
Four items were deleted because almost all participants
agreed with them; they stated the obvious. Three items (1, 8,
and 10) could be deleted from the scales to improve reliability
as their content was sufficiently covered by other items in the
questionnaire. An item we deleted from the analysis for
reasons of reliability is item 7: ‘‘If doctor and patient properly
consult with each other, it does not matter who makes the
final decision’’. We had felt that it reflected both the theory of
negotiated consent and that of actual identification. Others who
Table 3 Correlation among scales (Pearson’s r), n = 144
DKB PatD nonP RI
Doctor knows best (DKB)
Patient should decide (PatD) 20.09
Right to non-participation (nonP) 0.43* 0.24*
Obligatory risk information (RI) 0.31* 0.12 0.20
Sutherland item 20.22* 0.45* 20.03 0.02
*p,0.01 (two sided); p,0.05 (two sided).
Table 2 The four subscales of the Ideal Patient
Autonomy Scale (IPAS)
Scale I Doctor knows best: a=0.83 (surgeons: a=0.59; patients:
a=0.70)
16. If doctor and patient cannot agree on which treatment is best, the
doctor should make the treatment decision.
4. It is better that the doctor rather than the patient decides which is the
best treatment.
12. During the conversation, the patient must submit himself with
confidence to the expertise of the doctor.
20. The doctor can presume that the patient knows that people can die
during serious operations.
18. The patient should, without much information on the risk involved,
confidently undergo an operation.
Scale II Patient should decide: a=0.62 (surgeons: a= 0.62; patients:
a=0.63)
13. The patient himself must choose between the various treatments.
21. If a patient chooses a treatment with more health risks, the doctor
should respect this treatment decision.
19. It goes too far when the doctor decides which treatment is best for the
patient.
22. As it concerns the body and life of the patient, the patient should
decide.
Scale III Right to non-participation: a=0.66 (surgeons: a= 0.57;
patients: a=0.59)
3. If the patient does not want to receive information about risks, the
doctor should respect this.
15. Patients who become afraid when thinking about the treatment
decision should be left in peace by the doctor.
11. Patients should have the right not to be involved in the decision on the
treatment.
Scale IV Obligatory risk information: a=0.63 (surgeons: a=0.54;
patients: a=0.54)
5. The patient has to be informed on all the risks involved in an operation.
14. Before a patient consents to a treatment he should receive all
information on the risks involved.
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would like to use the questionnaire, and who value the
mentioned concepts (Molewijk AC, unpublished data),
should consider keeping this item and adding similar items
to form a reliable scale.
The positive correlation between the ‘‘doctor knows best’’
scale and the ‘‘right to non-participation’’ scale was in the
expected direction. The positive correlation between the
‘‘physician decides’’ scale and the ‘‘obligatory risk informa-
tion’’ scale confirms the findings in the literature that
information provision and decision making are distinct
concepts, and that the physician who decides for the patients
should still fulfil all requirements regarding risk disclosure.
The positive correlation between the ‘‘patient should decide’’
scale and the ‘‘right to non-participation’’ scale may be
explained by the fact that both scales encompass items
stating that the patient’s word is law. This correlation may
also indicate that those who believe that a patient should
decide also believe that in certain situations the patient may
decide to delegate his or her decision to the physician—a
view that is reflected among others in the theory of
procedural independence. These hypotheses deserve further
exploration.
Our final questionnaire consists of 14 items, which form
the scales presented in table 2. As stated above, item 7 could
well be retained but similar items should then preferably be
added to create a reliable scale. Three of the scales have an a
of less than 0.70, which is less than ideal. But given the early
stages of our validation research, the highly abstract nature
of the concepts that we wish to assess, and the fact that our
patients had generally low education levels (and therefore
may have had difficulty understanding the items, which may
have reduced the internal consistency of the responses), we
believe it to be acceptable. It will be worth the time and effort
to increase the number of items and reduce measurement
error in other ways. Further, reverse scoring of some of the
items should reduce acquiescence. Most correlations among
scales, and between the scales and the Sutherland question,
supported the validity of the scale. We do not know whether
the factor structure that we found can be reproduced in other
cultures, because ideals of autonomy do not only differ by
culture, but perceptions of aspects as normatively inherent to
autonomy may also be different. We therefore urge others to
adapt and use this scale and to present psychometric analyses
to obtain more insight into this complicated but highly
interesting concept. The scale can then be used to compare
populations with respect to their views on autonomy, and to
assess what patient or physician characteristics are correlated
with certain ideal types. As stated in the introduction, we
believe that social practice should be used as a moral source as
morality derives its meaning from the context. Use of our
questionnaire may enrich the current debates on the ethical
aspects of evidence based patient choice9 and shared decision
making.20 24 In our study, support was clearly found for other
concepts of autonomy than the liberal individualist, such as
that of procedural independence. This concept does not fit very
well the paradigm of evidence based patient choice. Thus,
more insight into the views on autonomy that are found in
practice may on the one hand help sharpen ethical theory. On
the other hand, it may point to beliefs and attitudes in practice
that are less ideal, from a normative viewpoint, and need
modification.
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APPENDIX 1 ORIGINAL PATIENT AUTONOMY
QUESTIONNAIRE
See next page.
APPENDIX 2 DETAILS OF THE STATISTICAL
ANALYSES
In the initial exploratory factor analysis, five factors were
found after varimax rotation, with eigenvalues greater than
1.0, of which the last two each consisted of two items only
(items 5 and 14, and items 7 and 10, respectively). Because
the latter factor had very poor reliability (a=0.27), and as
the factors 5 to 18 lay more or less on a straight line on the
scree plot (which separates important early factors from
random error in the later factors, and usually results in fewer
factors than a solution based on eigenvalues), we forced the
procedure to extract four factors (see table 1). We performed
an additional factor analysis to assess the impact of the
decision to delete the four items with extreme scores. The
same factor structure emerged, and in a subsequent reliability
analysis the four items were deleted anyway.











Physician should decide, based
on all that is known
13 84.6 (17.4) 20.2 (16.8) 74.4 (24.2) 87.5 (16.1)
Physician should decide,
strongly taking the patient’s
opinion into account
55 55.9 (30.2) 43.4 (24.1) 51.5 (28.1) 79.8 (23.0)
Physician and patient should
decide together, on basis of
equity
50 63.3 (29.9) 58.8 (19.6) 62.7 (29.3) 82.8 (26.1)
Patient should decide, strongly
taking the physician’s opinion
into account
19 46.8 (30.4) 62.8 (21.3) 61.0 (29.9) 88.2 (16.4)
Patient should decide, based on
all that he or she knows or hears
about the treatments
7 43.6 (31.2) 60.7 (20.0) 47.6 (26.2) 78.6 (22.5)
*Significant difference between levels (p = 0.003) and linear trend (p = 0.008).
Significant difference between levels (p,0.001) and linear trend (p,0.001).
`Significant difference between levels (p = 0.05).
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The resulting summary scale scores are obtained by sum-
ming the item scores (without weighting) and transforming
these to a 0–100 scale as follows: summary score= (1006
(scale score2minimum score)/(maximum score2minimum
score)).
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1. The doctor must choose the treatment with the least health risk, even
when the patient wants a treatment with more health risks.
LJ No
2. It is good if the patients asks the doctor critical questions. LI, NC No
3. If the patient does not want to receive information about risks, the doctor
should respect this.
LI, NC Yes
4. It is better that the doctor rather than the patient decides which the best
treatment is.
LJ, SA, PI Yes
5. The patient has to be informed on all the risks involved in an operation. LJ, LI Yes
6. The doctor should not only pay attention to the medical aspects; he or
she should also pay attention to the personal experiences of the patient.
I, SA No
7. If doctor and patient properly consult with each other, it does not matter
who takes the final decision.
NC, I, SA, PI See Discussion
8. Every patient is obliged to actively think about the appropriate treatment. LI, NC, I No
9. If patients do not understand something they should tell their doctor this. NC, PI No
10. It goes too far when patients themselves have to decide which
treatment is best for them.
PI, SA No
11. Patients should have the right not to be involved in the decision on the
treatment.
PI, SA Yes
12. During the conversation, the patient must submit himself with
confidence to the expertise of the doctor.
PI, SA Yes
13. The patient himself must choose between the various treatments. LI Yes
14. Before a patient consents to a treatment he should receive all
information on the risks involved.
LJ Yes
15. Patients who become afraid when thinking about the treatment decision
should be left in peace by the doctor.
SA, PI Yes
16. If doctor and patient cannot agree on which treatment is best, the
doctor should take the final decision.
LJ, LI Yes
17. Before the decision on the appropriate treatment is taken, the goals
and wishes of the patient must be clearly known.
NC, SA, I No
18. The patient should, without much information on the risk involved,
confidently undergo an operation.
PI, SA Yes
19. It goes too far when the doctor decides which treatment is best for
the patient.
LI, LJ Yes
20. The doctor can presume that the patient knows that people can die
during serious operations.
LJ, PI Yes
21. If a patient chooses a treatment with more health risks, the doctor
should respect this treatment decision.
LI, LJ Yes
22. As it concerns the body and life of the patient, the patient should decide. LI, I Yes
*I, actual identification; LJ, legal liberal; LI, liberal individualism; PI, procedural independence (critical reflection);
NC, negotiated consent; SA, Socratic autonomy (existential fragility); as classified independently by two
researchers (AMS, ACM).
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